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The paper combines an economic-geography model of agglomeration and periphery with a 
model of species diversity and looks at optimal policies of biodiversity conservation. The 
subject of the paper is "natural" biodiversity, which is inevitably impaired by anthropogenic 
impact. Thus, the economic and the ecological system compete for space and the question 
arises as to how this conflict should be resolved. The decisive parameters of the model are 
related to biological diversity (endemism vs. redundancy of species) and the patterns of 
economic geography (centrifugal and centripetal forces). As regards the choice of 
environmental-policy instruments, it is shown that Pigouvian taxes do not always establish the 
optimal allocation. 
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1 Introduction 
This paper uses recent advances in economic geography models of international trade and factor 
mobility to assess the incentives for regions to agglomerate economic activity versus preserve 
biodiversity. We consider a world consisting of two regions, home and foreign. Both regions 
contain an economic system in which a manufacturing industry, characterized by increasing 
returns and monopolistic competition, as well as an ecological system containing biodiversity 
(species richness), which is a global public good. The economic and the ecological system 
compete for space. Increased economic activity results in both loss of species richness and of the 
total biomass of each species population. From this trade-off, the question arises where economic 
activities should be performed and where biodiversity should be preserved. The next question 
then is by which policy instruments an optimal spatial allocation of economic activities and 
natural habitat can be achieved.  
We use a model of the new-economic-geography type to address these questions. New 
economic geography was introduced by Krugman (1991) in his seminal book and has resulted in 
a large variety of models addressing various questions related to spatial patterns of economic 
activities involving processes of agglomeration and dispersion. See Fujita et al. (1999), Neary 
(2001), and Baldwin et al. (2003) for overviews. Common to all these models is the assumption a 
monopolistically competitive market structure, usually modeled à la Dixit and Stiglitz (1977), 
and "iceberg" transportation costs, i.e. the assumption that a certain fraction of a traded 
commodity "melts away" during transport.
1 We use this approach, but make some simplifying 
                                                 
*   The authors thank John Tschirhart and the participants of the 2007 conference of Committee of 
Environmental and Resource Economics of the "Verein für Socialpolitik" for helpful comments and 
suggestions. Michael Rauscher wishes to thank the Centre of Advanced Study (CAS) at the Norwegian 
Academy of Science and Letters for its support and hospitality. Parts of the paper were written 
presented in seminars during a stay at CAS in 2006 as part of the project "Environmental Economics: 
Policy Instruments, Technology Development, and International Coordination". The authors bear full 
responsibility for errors and shortcomings. 
1   Iceberg transportation costs are generally attributed to Samuelson (1952), but the concept is much 
older and dates back to Thünen (1842, p. 16), who developed a theory of "central places" and assumed 
about transport costs that a fraction of the grain transported from the rural area to the city, the "central 
place", is eaten by the horses pulling the carts.   2
assumptions. Unlike in most other new-economic-geography models, we assume that there is 
only one factor of production. Moreover, we assume quasilinear preferences such that our model 
is essentially partial equilbrium. 
As regards biodiversity, the paper addresses the issue of "natural" biodiversity, or, as Eichner 
and Tschirhart (2007) put it: people have a preference for "naturalness". The starting point is an 
ecological model that is based on an "as if" optimization model. Species act as if they want to 
maximize their net energy. See Pethig and Tschirhart (2001) for the basic argument. The 
carrying capacity of ecological systems is negatively affected by economic activities such as 
human habitation and industrial production. This establishes the link between the economic and 
the ecological system and generates a trade-off between the objectives of satisfying material 
needs and conserving biodiversity. Anthropogenic impact via habitation, production, and 
consumption inevitably impairs natural habitats and reduces natural biodiversity. Of course, 
there are some economic activities that may actually increase biodiversity, e.g. in organic 
farming, but they are not the subject of this paper. We exclusively deal with "natural" bio-
diversity. The question then is how to resolve the conflict between material wants and the 
preservation of pristine ecosystems. Is it better to concentrate ecologically harmful activities in 
one region and leave the other region untouched as a protected area or should one distribute 
economic activities more evenly in space? It will be shown that the answer to this question 
depends on the properties of the ecosystems under consideration. To this end, we employ the 
concepts of endemism and redundancy. Endemic species occur in only one region, whereas 
redundant species occur in both regions. The degree of endemism versus redundancy will be 
crucial for the solution of the conflict between economic activities and biodiversity conservation.  
The literature on spatial aspects of the economy-environment conflict is small, particularly if 
the new-economic-geography contributions are concerned. Siebert's (1985) handbook article was 
written before the emergence of the new economic geography. Kanbur et al. (1995) model space 
as a continuous variable and look at the impact of environmental regulation on the location of 
polluting industries. Rauscher (2000) and Pflüger (2001) address environmental issues in a 
genuine new-economic-geography setting, but do not address issues related to biodiversity 
issues. Some ecology-economic models have analyzed the spatial interdependence of landscapes 
(Bockstael 1996; Koskela and Ollikainen (2001) or renewable resource models that include a 
spatial diffusion process (Brock and Xepapadeas 2006; Smith et al. 2007; Sanchirico and Wilen 
2005) in a wide class of environmental problems, from biological invasions to natural reserve 
creation to provision of ecological services. But these models typically do not consider the 
centrifugal-centripetal effects of new economic geography to analyze the optimal spatial 
allocation of economic activity as opposed to biodiversity conservation.  Such effects have been 
long recognized in ecology; e.g., Okubo (2001) notes that biological resources are distributed in 
space under analogous forces promoting “spreading” or “concentrating”, and these processes 
   3
along with inter-specific competition determine the spatial patterns exhibited by species.
2 While 
recognizing the importance of this spatial dimension, recent contributions to the economics of 
biodiversity preservation have focused on a unified ecological, economic and genetic approach 
to modelling the valuation problem rather than considering the opposing centrifugal-centripetal 
forces influencing the location and size of optimal habitat relative to economic activity (Brock 
and Xepapadeas 2003; Metrick and Weitzman 1998). To our knowledge, our paper is the first 
contribution that develops a new-economic-geography model to analyze this key issue in bio-
diversity conservation.  
The paper is organized as follows. The next section presents the essentials of a simple new-
economic-geography model with two symmetric regions and links it to an ecological model of 
species richness and biodiversity. Section 3 looks at a variant of the model where households are 
mobile, but factors of production are region-specific. It will be seen that the laissez-faire 
equilibrium is characterised by dispersion, i.e. housholds locate such that they are equally 
distributed across regions. Biodiversity considerations, however, may favour concentration of 
settlements in one of the two regions and we discuss policy measures inducing the 
corressponding change in location patterns. It will be seen that Pigouvian taxes are useful to 
etsablish the optimum. Section 4 will be devoted to case where not only people but also factors 
of production are mobile. We call this the mobile-capital model since we assume that factors nd 
factor owners can locate in different regions. Laissez faire leads to agglomeration in this case, 
i.e. factors and households tend to concentrate in the same region. If biodiversity considerations 
are taken into account, however, a more equal distribution of economic activities across regions 
may be preferable. It is shown that taxes alone cannot establish the dersired allocation of factors 
and households, but a combination of command-and-control regulation may do the job. Section 5 
then addresses a scenario where factors and factor owners cannot be separated from each other 
geographically. We call this the mobile-workers model: the worker lives in the region in which 
the factor she is endowed with is employed. Again, the laissez-faire equilibrium is agglomeration 
and the biodiversity objective may call for a more equal distribution of factors and factor owners. 
In this case, taxes does not support the desired allocation and the policy maker has to take 
recourse to command and control. Section 6 summarizes.    
 
                                                 
2   Interestingly, the analogy between these forces in spatial ecology and the typical agglomeration versus 
dispersion effects in new economic geography was noted by early developments of core-periphery 
models.  For example, Fujita et al. (1999, ch. 6) cite the analogy between the stabilization properties 
observed in their core-periphery models and the Turing effect in spatial ecology, which implies that an 
initially spatially homogeneous state, such as a uniform distribution of species, can be transformed 
into a stable but patterned state under perturbations induced by diffusion.  
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2 The Economic-Ecological Model 
Let us consider a world consisting of two regions, home and foreign. We identify all variables of 
the foreign region by asterisks. Initially, it is assumed that both regions are identical. Preferences 
and production technologies are the same at home and abroad. Assume that the total population 
in these two regions is 1, of which N live in the home region and (1-N) abroad. All households 
are identical and factor ownership is equally distributed across the households such that each 
household owns one unit of the factor. Let y and y* denote the factor incomes of domestic and 
foreign households, respectively. Moreover, each household inelastically supplies one unit of a 
numéraire good. Thus, gross income of a representative domestic household is 1+y. In addition, 
we model a transfer across regions. Let us assume that domestic households are taxed at rate t 
and that the tax revenue is redistributed lump-sum to all domestic and foreign households. Thus 
the net tax payment of a domestic household is (1–N)t and the transfer income accruing to a 
foreign household is tN. The tax rate may be negative, denoting a transfer in the opposite 
direction, i.e. from foreign to home households. But since the model is symmetric anyway, the 
following analysis will be confined to positive tax rates. A representative domestic household's 
budget constraint is 
   .       (1)  t N y x di i m i p di i c i p
n n
) 1 ( 1 ) ( ) ( * ) ( ) (
*
0 0 − − + = + +∫ ∫ θ
where the right-hand side is income and the right-hand side expenditure. x is the consumption of 
the numéraire good, c(i) is consumption of a domestic variety, m(i) denotes the imported and 
consumed quantity of a foreign variety, and θ is the "iceberg" transportation cost mark-up. Thus 
p(i) and p*(i) are the prices of domestic and foreign goods, respectively, and n and n* measure 
product variety. With a transfer income Nt, the budget constraint of a representative foreign 
household is then 
   .        ( 1 ' )   Nt y x di i m i p di i c i p
n n
+ + = + +∫ ∫ * 1 * ) ( * ) ( ) ( * ) ( *
*
0 0 θ
Note that we futher simplify the basic economic geography models suggested by Baldwin et al 
(2003). In our model, there is only one factor of production and the numéraire good is not 
produced by means of scarce factors but "falls from heaven", albeit in limited supply. This, 
together with the assumption of  a very lean utility function (see the following paragraph) 
simplifies the derivation of results considerably, but also affects the qualitative results, 
particularly in the scenario of mobile workers. This will be discussed indetail in Section 5. 
Utility is assumed to be quasilinear such that, for the home household, we have 




() ( ) (,* )
nn
u c id i m jd j x d s s
γγ ω
γ
=++ + ∫∫ ) .        (2) 
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) 1 , 0 ( ∈ γ  is a measure of substitutability such that γ=1 denotes perfect substitutes and γ=0 an 
elasticity of substitution being unity. The specification of utility derived from consumption is 
even simpler than that in Pflüger (2001, 2004), who took the logarithm of a constant-returns-to-
scale CES function. d is an index of global biodiversity, which we assume is determined by the 
number of species inhabiting the two regions, s and s*, respectively. Below, we discuss in more 
detail the properties of the biodiversity function, d. Finally, the function ω(.) indicates the degree 
of a household's preference for biodiversity. It has the standard properties: ω'>0 and ω"<0. We 
assume that people in the foreign region have the same utility function (2). Thus, biodiversity is a 
global public good in this model. 
  Domestic utility maximization results in the inverse demand functions 
   ,        ( 3 a )   ) , 0 ( for                               ) ( ) (
1 n i i c i p ∈ =
− γ
   .       (3b) 




Compared to many other economic-geography models, the demand functions are very simple 
(e.g., see Baldwin et al. 2003; Fujita et al. 1999 and Neary 2001). They do not contain a CES 
price index, for example, which is a direct result from specifying the utility function (2) as quasi-
linear.  
Moreover, it is assumed that all varieties are produced with the same technologies and the 
same factor requirements. Then the prices for these varieties are identical and the arguments i 
can be dropped. Using (1), (3a), and (3b) in (2) gives the domestic and foreign indirect utility 
functions, respectively:   
   () ( ( * , * *
1
) 1 ( 1 ~ 1
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The producers 
The supply side of the market for the non-numéraire good is characterized by Dixit-Stiglitz 
monopolistic competition (Dixit and Stiglitz 1977). Assume that each firm produces only one 
variety of this differentiated good. It is a monopolist in its own market segment but its profits are 
driven to zero by free market entry and exit. There are fixed costs of production, and thus the 
number of firms is finite. There is one factor of production and its price, which is exogenous to 
the firm, is w. There is a fixed cost of Fw and a constant marginal cost vw, where F and v denote 
technological unit input requirements. If q(i) is the output of domestic firm i, its profits are   
   ( w i vq F i q i p i ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( + − = π        ( 5 )  
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Ex ante, profits seem to be variable and can be maximized; ex post, they are zero due to free 
entry and exit of firms. 
Since producers have the same cost and demand functions and only differ in the design of the 
commodity that they produce, we can drop the argument i  and consider a representative 
producer. Profit maximization yields that marginal revenue equals marginal cost:  
   vw p = γ .             
To simplify notation, we invoke a normalization assumption and choose units of the input such 
that γ = v. Thus,  
   p = w            ( 6 )  
and, by analogy, p* = w* for foreign producers. Using (6) and its foreign analogue in the zero-







q q ,          ( 7 )  
This is a standard result especially for economic geography models using the Dixit/Stiglitz 
version of monopolistic competition (See Baldwin et al. 2003; Fujita et al. 1999; Neary 2001). 
With costs being homogeneous of degree 1 in the factor prices, the output of a single variety is 
determined by the price elasticity and the parameters of the cost function, but it does not depend 
on any other variables of the model.  
Given that each firm produces the same quantity, the number of firms can be inferred from the 
factor market equilibrium. Let the factor endowments in the two regions be K  and  K*, 
respectively. As a normalization, K+K*=1. As assumed in (5), domestic factor demand is 
n(F+vq) and by analogy its foreign equivalent is n*(F+vq). Using γ=v and (7), the equilibrium 
conditions for the factor markets are    
   ()
F
K
n γ − = 1 ,            ( 8 )  







1 * γ .           ( 8 ' )  
Using (7) again, we obtain the conditions  
    Q=nq=K           ( 9 )  
 and  
     Q*=n*q*=1-K,            ( 9 ' )  
which will turn out to be very useful in the course of the investigation. 
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Goods market equilibrium 
The goods-market equilibrium is determined by the equality of supply and demand, i.e. by 
   * ) 1 ( m N Nc q θ − + = ,          
   * ) 1 ( * c N m N q − + = θ ,         
Using the domestic inverse demand functions, (3a) and (3b), and their foreign equivalents, we 
obtain 
   [] 1
1
) 1 ( − − + = γ Θ p N N q ,           
   [] 1
1
* ) 1 ( * − − + = γ Θ p N N q ,           
with  1 1 < = − γ
γ
θ Θ . This can be solved for the equilibrium prices once (7) is used to substitute 
for q and q*: 
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Indirect utility 
Using (10) and (10') to substitute for p and p* and (8) and (8') to substitute for n and n* in (4) 
and (4') yields 
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We close our model by deriving the impacts of economic activity on biodiversity. Assume that 
there are species   at home and  [ s i , 0 ∈ [ ] * , 0 * s i ∈ abroad. The total number of species, s (s*), is 
used as an index of domestic (foreign) species richness, which is the standard ecological measure 
used most regularly in ecological-economic modeling (Armsworth et al. 2004; Baumgärtner 
   8
2004). s and s* are very large and will therefore be treated as real numbers in the following 
analysis. 
We adopt a standard assumption from the literature on ecological-economic integrated system 
modeling and suggest that each species maximizes its net energy (Crocker and Tschirhart 1992; 
Tschirhart 2000, Pethig and Tschirhart 2001, Eichner and Pethig 2003; Finnoff and Tschirhart 
2003;). Let b(i) denote the biomass of species i (measured in energy units) and   be the 
effort (energy) required to maintain biomass b(i), with partial derivatives eb>0, ebb>0, es<0, and 
ebs<0. Increasing marginal cost reflects congestion, i.e. the fact that it becomes increasingly 
difficult for a species to maintain its biomass if its biomass is already large. The negative impacts 
of species richness on total and marginal costs indicate that diverse ecosystems function better 
than more homogeneous ones. See Tilman, Polasky and Lehman (2005), for example. In the 
foreign region, we have an analogous effort function 
( s i b i e ), ( , )
( ) * *), ( * *, * s i b i e . Therefore the following 
results, derived for the home region, carry over to the foreign region. In the home region, the 
problem is to maximize   with respect to b. This results in  ( s i b i e i b ), ( , ) ( − )
   .            () 1 ), ( , = s i b i eb
Total differentiation yields  




), ( , ) (
> − =
s i b i e




bs         
Total biomass, i.e. the integral of all species-specific biomasses, b(i), over the interval [0,s] is 
limited by carrying capacity, B, which depends on factors exogenous to this model, such as 
climate, suitable species habitats and other environmental conditions. Moreover, carrying 
capacity is affected by economic activities. In particular, B is a decreasing function of human 
population size, N, and the total output of the manufacturing sector, nq, which turns out to equal 
K. See equations (9) and (9'). Thus, 
 )           ( 1 2 )   , ( ) (
0
K N B di i b
s
= ∫
with BL<0 and BK<0. Moreover, assume that B(.,.) is strictly concave. Total differentiation of 
(12) using Leibniz' rule yields 
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,         (13b) 
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where db(i)/ds is taken from (12). Since the denominators in (13a) and (13b) are unambiguously 
positive, it follows that increased economic activity will result in both loss of species richness 
and in the total biomass of each species population. Although (13) and (13b) were derived for the 
home region, we assume that the same relationships govern economic-ecological interactions in 
the foreign region. 
Recall from (2) that biodiversity is a global public good, and that there is some index, d, 
which measures the current state of global biodiversity. However, because species may be 
redundant, i.e. the same species may be found in both regions, the global biodiversity index is 
unlikely to be the sum of the number of species in the two regions. To avoiding the double 
counting of species that redundancy implies, we assume that the biodiversity index function, 
d(s,s*), has the following properties (subscripts denoting partial derivatives): 
. 0 *   and   0 for      * *) , ( *, *) , 0 ( , ) 0 , (
, 0 , 0 , 0 , 0 , 0 * * * * *
≠ ≠ + ≤ = =
≤ = ≥ ≥ > >
s s s s s s d s s d s s d
d d d d d d s s ss s s ss s s     (14) 
The first-order partial derivatives are self-evident; global biodiversity increases with greater 
species richness in either region. The cross-partial derivatives are negative since an increase in 
the number of species in one region raises the probability that an additional species in the other 
region is redundant. Thus, the larger the absolute value of dss*, the larger is redundancy. In the 
case of strict endemism, dss* may be zero. The second own-derivatives, dss and ds*s* , are non-
negative. They are zero if the number of species is zero in the other region or if species are 
stricly endemic. If there is some redundancy and if the number of species in the other region is 
larger than zero, they are positive. The underlying intuition is as follows: an increase in number 
of species in one region raises the probability that species in the other region become redundant; 
however, as this number goes to infinity, this probability approaches a finite value, usually 1. In 
other words: if the number of species is large, the probability of redundancy is already very large 
and cannot be increased much further by adding new species. Thus, the increase in the risk of 
redundancy is declining in the number of species and, therefore, dss>0 and ds*s*>0. Redundancy 
implies that diversity is in general less than the sum of the numbers of species in the two regions, 
equality only holding in the case of perfect endemism. A special case of the diversity function is 
the CES function 
  () () ρ ρ ρ + + + + = 1
1
1 1 * * , s s s s d , 
where ρ > 0 measures the degree of redundancy. It is seen that this function indeed has the 
properties stated in (14). For ρ=0, all species are endemic and d=s+s*. For ρ→∞, no species is 
endemic and d=max(s,s*) This CES specification of the d(.,.) function serves only as an 
illustration. For the remainder of the paper, we will continue using the general measure of bio-
diversity, d(s,s*). 
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3 Agglomeration and Biodiversity: The Case of Immobile Factors of Production 
We start with the scenario in which factors of production are immobile. One might view this as a 
short-term model with capital being the factor under consideration. Capital is immobile;its 
owners, however, can move. In a first step, we will consider a laissez-faire situation without 
government intervention. Then we will look at welfare-maximizing policies for the case of 
symmetric regions and finally consider the case of asymmetric regions in which the species 
richness at home and abroad is affected by economic activity differently.  
  We assume symmetry in the factor endowments, i.e. K=K*=0.5. All households have the 
same factor income, y (or y
* for foreign households), which is independent of their region of 
residence. Since from (6) w = p, and by analogy for foreign producers w* = p*, we have  
      y = y* = 0.5 (p+p*) .            ( 1 5 )  
Moreover,  K=K*=0.5 implies that the impact of production on biodiversity is constant and 
identical in both countries. 
  Let us first consider the laissez-faire case without policies directed at biodiversity con-
servation. A spatial equilibrium is attained if the indirect utilities in the two regions are equal. 
Then there are no incentives to migrate. Migration of households does occur if the indirect 
utilities in the two regions differ: 
   () ( )



























t u u .   (16) 
where –t is tax paid by domestic citizens, but not paid by foreigners and the second term on the 
right-hand side is the consumer-surplus differential, which will be denoted CS-CS in what 
follows. CS-CS is decreasing in N. This is due to a congestion effect. People prefer to live in the 
less populated region because prices of local goods (that do not contain a transportation cost 
mark-up) are low if population density, and therefore demand, is low. Moreover, it can be shown 
that the consumer surplus differential is convex for N > 0.5 and concave for N < 0.5. See the 
appendix for the formal proofs. 
Figure 1 represents the indirect-utility differential assuming that the tax rate is positive. The 
bending line is the consumer surplus differential. Without taxes, there is a unique equilibrium, 
E0, which is stable. The horizontal line represents the tax rate. An increase in the tax rate leads to 
a leftward shift of the equilibrium, i.e. taxation of domestic citizens to finance transfers given to 
foreign households causes outward migration. Algebraically: dN/dt<0. 
 





CS – CS* 
t 
 
Figure 1: Indirect utility and the migration equilibrium 
 
A benevolent policy maker's objective is to maximize total welfare,  () * ~ 1 ~ u N u N W − + = . 
Using (11), (11'), K=K*=0.5, the fact that Ny+(1-N)y* = 0.5(p+p*), employing (10) and (10') to 
substitute for p and p*, and rearranging terms, one can write the welfare functional as 
   ()
() () () ()




























+ = − − −
−
. 
This is maximized with respect to the tax rate, t. Note that the impact of the tax rate on welfare, 
W, is always via the population variable, N. Since the latter is a monotonic function of t, as 
shown in Figure 1, we can represent the welfare impacts of a change in t by a change in N. Thus, 
   () ( )











































N N F dN
dW
s s . (17) 
Using (16), it is seen that the first term on the right-hand side of equation (17) equals CS-CS*. If 
this consumer surplus differential is positive, people migrate to the home region and equation 
(16) shows that, if biodiversity is neglected for a moment, this enhances welfare. If CS-CS* is 
negative, migration into the opposite direction is equally welfare-enhancing. Therefore, without 
consideration of biodiversity, free mobility of residents would establish the socially desirable 
equilibrium. However, besides income and consumer surplus, biodiversity matters, too. To 
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simplify our analysis but with little loss of generality, we assume that ds/dN = ds*/dN* = – 1. 
Equation (17) can then be rewritten:  
     () ' * * ω s s d d CS CS
dN
dW
− − − = .        ( 1 8 )  
The second term on the right-hand side of (18) represents the effect on global biodiversity. To 
determine whether dW/dN=0 is a condition for a maximum, we take the derivative of (18) with 
respect to N: 
    
()











+ − + − +
−
= ) .   (19) 




CS CS d * −
, is unambiguously negative. Moreover, the second term on the right-
hand side of eq. (19) is negative, too. These two terms point to an interior optimum. In contrast, 
( ' 2 * * * ) ω s s ss ss d d d + −   is positive. This means that the second-order condition is not always satis-
fied and that boundary optima may be optimal, particularly if the degree of redundancy measured 
by this term is large. This is shown in Figures 2a to 2c. The solid S-shaped curve represents the 
marginal consumer surplus and the dotted lines represent the biodiversity term, ( ' *) ω s s d d − . The 
biodiversity term, i.e. the negative value of the marginal utility of biodiversity, is subtracted from 
the marginal consumer surplus in order to arrive at the first-order condition, dW/dN=0. See 
equation (20). Local welfare maxima and minima occur when the two lines intersect. The 
following cases can be distinguished.  
•  Case 1. High endemism.  The absolute values of second partial derivatives of the d 
function are small or even zero. In the latter case, the biodiversity line crosses the 
abscissa with slope zero. In the former case, its slope is negative, but small. The objective 
function is concave and there is a single interior optimum characterized by an equal 
distribution of population across the two regions. This is shown in Figure 2a. 
•  Case 2. High redundancy. In this case, also shown in Figure 2a, the absolute values of the 
second derivatives of the d function are very large, such that that the biodiversity line is 
not only negatively sloped , but also steeper than the CS-CS*  line. As a result, the 
objective function is strictly convex and the optimum is a boundary solution in which all 
the population either lives in one region or in the other. 
   13
N 
    CS-CS*, 
   () ' * ω s s d d −  
* CS CS−  
Case 2 
(redundancy)  Case 1 
(endemism) 
 
Figure 2a: Characterization of optimum solutions: endemism vs. redundancy 
 
•  Case 3. Intermediate case I. In this case, depicted by Figure 2b, the two curves intersect 
three times. In the center, the biodiversity line is flatter than the consumer-surplus-
differential locus, indicating that this is a local maximum. The biodiversity line is steeper 
than CS-CS* in its tails and this implies that the other two intersection points are local 
minima and that the boundary solutions, N=0 and N=1, are local maxima. Whether the 
interior or the boundary solutions are optimal, depends on the parameters of the model. 
Again, a high degree of redundancy favors boundary solutions.  
•  Case 4. Intermediate case II. Another possibility of local extrema is shown by Figure 2c. 
Here redundancy dominates when population is equally distributed across the two 
regions. Thus symmetry cannot be an optimum. However, as biodiversity is diminished 
in the region that experiences the increase in population density, this loss of biodiversity 
causes a utility loss which increases more than proportionally. Thus, a concentration of 
population in one region becomes also undesirable. Therefore, the optima are interior 
equilibria with asymmetric distribution of population, e.g. such that 20% of the popul-
ation live in one region and 80% in the other. This scenario is possible if there is a large 
degree of redundancy and, at the same time, the utility function is substantially bent such 
that large reductions in biodiversity loss lead to more-than-proportional welfare losses.  
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Figure 2b: Characterization of optimum solutions: intermediate case I 
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Figure 2c: Characterization of optimum solutions: intermediate case II 
 
These scenarios are intuitive. Without the consideration of biodiversity, people prefer to avoid 
congestion externalities and do not agglomerate. From the point of biodiversity conservation, 
however, people should agglomerate if there is a large degree of species redundancy. Some of 
the species driven to extinction in one region will be preserved in the other region and this 
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implies that it is better for biodiversity conservation if people settle on the same spot instead of 
being dispersed widely geographically. It should be noted, that the dispersion equilibrium, 
N=0.5, is the laissez-faire solution. In order to obtain agglomeration, transfers from one region to 
the other are necessary. In the case of complete agglomeration, N=0 or N=1, the tax rates are pro-
hibitive. In terms of natural-habitat conservation, this means that a natural reserve is established, 
with regulations so strict that activities interfering with species richness are ruled out. In the case 
of the interior asymmetric optimum, Case 4 in the preceding discussion, the tax rate is less than 
the prohibitive one. Its optimum level can be determined by setting dW/dN=0 in equation (18) 
and using the fact that the tax rate must be such that the consumer-surplus difference is com-
pensated for, i.e. t=CS–CS*. Combining these two conditions gives the tax rate- required to 
establish the optimum: 
     ( ' *) ω s s d d t − = .          ( 2 0 )  
The right-hand side is the marginal environmental damage due to an additional resident. Thus, 
condition (20) is just a Pigouvian tax rule. 
The optima have been derived under the restriction that ds/dN = ds*/d(1–N) = – 1.. Relaxing 
this restriction would not change the qualitative result that, depending on the parameters of the 
model, three types of optima are possible: laissez-faire, prohibitive taxes leading to complete 
agglomeration, and a moderate tax-transfer scheme that leads to incomplete agglomeration. It 
makes sense to assume asymmetry. If the ecological system in one region is more vulnerable to 
human intervention than in the other, ds/dN and ds*/d(1–N) are different. If domestic species 
richness is affected more drastically by higher population density than foreign species richness, 
then this shifts the biodiversity line in Figures 2a to 2c upwards. For the intersection points in 
these figures, this implies that local maxima would be shifted to the left and local minima are 
shifted to the right. In Case 1, with endemism dominating, the optimum would be characterized 
by N < 0.5. The population density in Home must be reduced and this can be achieved by taxes 
according to equation (20). In the scenarios that produced symmetric optima with partial or com-
plete agglomeration in the preceding investigation (Cases 2 and 4), this would now implies that 
there is a single optimum with agglomeration in Foreign. The remaining Case 3 would also 
produce a shift of the optimum towards agglomeration in Foreign, independent of whether the 
interior solution or one of the boundary solutions is globally optimal in the symmetric case. 
4 Optimal Agglomeration and Biodiversity: The Case of Mobile Capital  
Let us now consider an alternative scenario of mobility: people are mobile like in the preceding 
section of the paper, but factors are mobile as well. Moreover assume that factors can be 
separated spatially from their owners. This is the case of mobile capital or, as Baldwin et al. 
(2003) call it, the footloose-capital model. Compared to the set-up in the previous section of the 
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paper, this can be viewed as a long-term scenario in which capital can be moved from one region 
to the other. As in the previous scenario, factor income is independent of the location of the 
factors of production. However, in contrast to the preceding part of the paper, the regional 
allocation of the factors is variable. Thus, we have  
   y=y*=Kp+(1-K)p*.             ( 2 1 )  
instead of (15).  
To analyze the spatial allocation of economic activity, we will first look at the locations of the 
factors and then at the locations of their owners. Factors move if there is a difference in factor 
remunerations. From (10) and (10'), we have 
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and it follows that w>w* if N>1/2. Factors move to where the majority of the consumers live. 
Factors are indifferent where to locate if N=0.5. In Figure 3, this is represented by the vertical 
line at N=0.5. The horizontal parts of the locus are explained by the fact that factor shares cannot 
be larger than 1 or less than 0. In a next step, let us consider the behaviour of the factor owners. 
The difference in utility between East and West is 
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This line has a positive slope and it is seen that N>1 for K=1 and that N<0 for K=0. Thus, as N 
can neither be negative nor larger than 1, the indifference line must have vertical segments at the 
boundaries of the interval. This is also shown in Figure 3. For the sake of simplicity this indiffer-
ence line is drawn as a linear locus in the diagram. There are three equilibria: total agglomeration 
in one of the two regions or an equal distribution of population and factors across the regions. In 
models with multiple equilibria, the standard method to narrow down the set of equilibria to the 
feasible ones is to look at adjustment dynamics and stability: unstable equilibria are practically 
irrelevant and are excluded. Thus, let us consider adjustment dynamics of households and 
factors. As relocation of factors as well as of households is costly and takes time these adjust-
ments have finite speed. In the diagram, they are depicted by arrows. It is straightforward that the 
two agglomeration equilibria are stable whereas the symmetric equilibrium is unstable – with the 
   17
notable exception of a saddle path leading to this equilibrium for particular initial conditions. 
However, as initial conditions are historically given, the probability of starting exactly on this 
saddle is infinitesimally small. Thus, the corresponding equilibrium is irrelevant and, thus, the 








Figure 3: Mobility of factors and of factor owners 
 
Let us now consider welfare maximization. Welfare is  
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and its derivatives with respect to K and N are, 
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It is seen that, neglecting biodiversity for a moment, agglomeration is beneficial. (25a) indicates 
that capital should move to where the consumers are and (25b) implies that consumers should 
move to where the production takes place.
3 This is in accordance with the biodiversity objective 
                                                 
3   In particular, we have that the long term in brackets on the right-hand side of equation (24) is 1 in the 
case of complete agglomeration (K=N=1 or K=N=0), (0.5Θ+0.5) 
1-γ in the case of dispersion 
   18
if species are redundant. In the case where species are endemic, incomplete agglomeration may 
be preferable since – depending on the shape of the ω function, which measures the preference 
for biodiversity – the cost of large scale extinction of species in one of the two regions may 
dominate the positive effects of agglomeration to consumers and factor owners. This requires 
that the government take measures to avoid agglomeration. Taxation of consumers and factors 
locating in the agglomerating region could be an option. Figure 4 shows how location incentives 
affect consumers and factor owners. A tax on consumers locating in the home country shifts the 
indifference line upwards (depicted by the dotted line) such that consumers who were originally 
indifferent move to the foreign region. By the same argument, the factor owners' indifference 
locus is shifted to the right if domestic factor incomes are taxed (again depicted by a dotted line). 
The unstable equilibrium is shifted such that more factors and consumers are located in the home 
region, implying that the area of the diagram for which the home region is the attractor shrinks.  
1 




Figure 4: Mobility of factors and of factor owners: the impact of taxes 
 
Figure 4 illustrates that factors of production always tend to agglomerate and that taxes cannot be 
used to generate a more equal distribution of factors across regions. If biodiversity conservation 
requires such a distribution, this can only be achieved by command-and-control policies. The 
underlying reason is that there are no dispersive forces hampering the laissez-faire agglomeration 
of factors. In the case of consumer location, matters are different. Once the desired allocation of 
                                                                                                                                                             
(K=N=0.5), and Θ 
1-γ in the case of perfect separation (K=0, N=1 or vice versa). It follows that, 
neglecting biodiversity, welfare is the highest if factors of production and consumers locate in the 
same region.  
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factors is determined by command and control, taxes can be used to give consumers the right 
incentives to locate. This is depicted in Figure 5. The horizontal line depicts the allocation of 
factors enforced by command and control regulation. The increasing line is the consumers' 
indifference locus, which can be affected by the taxes introduced in Section 2. The optimal tax 
rate can be determined by combining equations (23) and (25b). Setting dW/dN=0 in equation 
(25b) gives the optimality condition that maximizes welfare with respect to the location of 
consumers for a given allocation of factors. Note that the first term on the right-hand side of 
(25b) is the consumer-surplus differential, which also occurs in (23). Using this, it follows that  
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which is the same condition as (20) if we again assume that the impact of population density on 
regional species richness is minus unity. The tax is a Pigouvian tax. 
1 




Figure 5: Mobility of factors and of factor owners:  
combination of command-and-control and taxation 
5 Optimal Agglomeration and Biodiversity: The Case of Mobile Workers  
Let us now consider a third scenario of mobility: people are mobile like in the preceding section 
of the paper, but they take their factors with them. This is the labor-mobility case. Workers 
cannot be separated from the factor they supply: when workers move, their factor of production 
moves with them. Thus,  
   K = N, 
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i.e. factor supply equals the number of housholds living in a region. Now income is not any more 
unaffected by the choice of the region of residence: y=w=p and y*=w*=p*. Using this in (13) 
and (13') and employing (12) and (12') to substitute for p and p*, respectively, yields 
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Figure 6: Indirect utility and the migration equilibria in the mobile-workers case 
 
For t=0, this differential is zero if Θ=1 and if N=0.5. In the former case, Θ=1, the consumer 
surplus in both regions is identical since with zero transportation costs consumers pay the same 
prices everywhere and factor prices are identical across regions as well. In the latter case, N=0.5, 
identical population implies that factor supply and final-goods demand are the same in both 
regions. Appendix A2 shows that the consumer-surplus differential is unambiguously increasing 
in  N such that the symmetric equilibrium (N=0.5) is unstable and the two agglomeration 
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equilibria (N=0 and N=1) are stable. Figure 6 illustrates this, where the consumer-surplus 
differential is assumed to be linear for simplicity. The introduction of a tax merely shifts the 
unstable equilibrium such that the part of the CS-CS* line for which the non-taxing region 
becomes the attractor for mobile workers is increased. It should be noted that other new-
economic-geography models produce different results. In particular, complete agglomeration is 
the laissez-faire solution only for a limited parameter range. Otherwise symmetric equilibria are 
stable and for critical parameter values bifurcations occur, which may be tomahawk-shaped like 
in Fujita et al. (1999) or pitchfork-shaped like in Pflüger (2004).  
Welfare, W, is  . From (26) and (26'):  * ~ ) 1 ( ~ u N u N − −
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Appendix A.3 shows that the first term on the right-hand side of (29) is increasing such that 
dW/dN=0 minimizes welfare in the absence of biodiversity concerns. The income-and-
consumption part of welfare is maximized for N=0 and N=1.
4  
For a graphical representation assume that ds/dN=ds/dK=ds*/dN*=ds*/dK* = – 1 like in 
Section 3 of this paper. The second term on the right-hand side of equation (29) then simply is 
( ' 2 *) ω s s d d − − , which is twice the effect known from the immobile-fators model. The reason is 
that each migrant now takes her factor with her and this has an additional adverse effect on bio-
diversity. Figure 6 depicts the marginal effect of a change in N on material well-being, MMW, 
and  ( ' 2 *) ω s s d d − . If the latter is larger than the former, an increase in N is welfare-deterior-
ating. Otherwise, it is welfare increasing  –  unless  ( ) ' 2 * ω s s d d MMW − = , which implies that a 
local welfare maximum or minimum has been attained. The possible shapes of the marginal 
value of biodiversity are the same is in Figures 1 and 2 and we depict two cases here. See Figure 
7. Case 1 assumes that species are largely endemic.In Case 2 redundancy dominates. In both 
cases, the symmetric solution, N=0.5, is a local minimum. Under dominance of endemism, Case 
1, incomplete agglomeration, either at home or abroad, is the optimum. If species are redundant, 
                                                 
4   Note, for example,  that the large term in brackets in the welfare functional, equation (28), equals 1 if 
N=0 or if N=1 and it equals (0.5+0.5Θ) 
1-γ < 1 if N=0.5 
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the boundary solutions of perfect agglomeration are optimal. Since agglomeration is the laissez-
faire equilibrium, environmental regulation to affect location decisions is not necessary in that 
case. Matters are different in case 1: A fraction of the workforce, which wants to locate in one 
region, has to be motivated to move to the other region. Taxes do not achieve this, because the 
incentive is either too small or so large that all workers, not only a fraction, wish to move. Thus, 
command and control is the appropriate type of environmental regulation.  
 
N 
    MMW, 







Figure 7: Optimal solutions in the mobile-factors case: endemism vs. redundancy 
 
6. Summary and conclusions 
In this paper we set out to demonstrate that the new-economic-geography framework for 
analyzing agglomeration and dispersion of economic activity can be extended to allow for the 
analogous forces promoting "spreading" or "concentrating" of biological species. The latter 
effects have long been recognized by ecologists as a key determinant of the spatial distribution of 
species (e.g., Okubo 2001) but have so far not been incorporated fully in economic-ecological 
models of biodiversity preservation. By addressing the spatial dimension of economic activity 
allocation and biodiversity conservation in a new-economic-geography framework, we have 
shown explicitly the economic and ecological factors that can determine the optimal location and 
size of nature reserves. Of particular importance in our model is that the centrifugal and centri-
petal forces of economic geography have their counterparts in the ecological system: endemism 
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and redundancy. If centrifugal forces dominate, people do not want to locate too close to each 
other. This is good for the ecological system if species are largely endemic. If centripetal forces 
dominate, free migration generates agglomeration. This is beneficial to the ecological system if 
species are largely redundant. Thus, material and ecological objectives may converge, but there 
may also be a conflict of interests. In the latter case, the government should intervene. We 
considered two types of regulation: taxes and command-and-control. Taxes are effective only if 
centrifugal forces dominate. In this case, interior migration equilibria are stable and taxes can be 
used to shift an interior equilibrium such that the optimal combination of biodiversity 
conservation and material well-being is achieved. If centripetal forces dominate, interior 
equilibria are unstable and boundary equilibria with full agglomeration are the laissez-faire 
outcome. Taxes do still shift the interior equilibrium, but this equilibrium is now unstable and, 
thus, irrelevant in practice. The only way to implement the optimum then is command and 
control. 
The model in this paper is based on a number of simplyfying assumptions that do affect the 
results. In particular we assumed the existence of only one factor of production, a special quasi-
linear utility function, and a manna-type numéraire good. With these assumptions we were able 
to derive explicit solutions algebraically whithout taking recourse to numerical calibrations of the 
model. The approach is limited insofar as we arrive at the conclusion that the agglomeration 
forces unambiguously dominate in the mobile-workers model. Other models generate different 
results. In many cases, centrifugal forces dominate over a certain parameter range and one 
obtains bifurcations typical of core-periphery models such as in Fujita et al. (1999) and Pflüger 
(2004). Such models may produce a larger variety of interactions between economic and 
ecological systems. We conjecture however, that the most of the basic conclusions remain the 
same. Thus, the relationship between centrifugal versus centripetal forces in the economic 
system and endemism versus redundancy in the ecological system is likely to be unchanged. 
Moreover, the conclusion that Pigouvian taxes are useful if symmetric equilibria are stable 
whereas they are ineffective if full agglomeration is stable should carry over to other types of 
new-economic-geography models.  
  In sum, a general principle following from our results is that a policy for determining the 
location of nature preserves needs to take into account the centrifugal-centripetal forces that 
dominate both economic and ecological systems. For the economic system, these forces are well-
known from the economic geography literature: agglomeration occurs because producers like 
large markets and consumers like cheap goods; dispersion occurs because people do not like 
congestion arising from too many consumers creating a high demand for domestic goods that 
lack the iceberg transport cost. Here we identify similar, but less well known, countervailing 
effects for the ecological system: greater species richness in a region increases global 
biodiversity; however, an increase in the number of species in a region also raises the probability 
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that species in the other region become redundant. Because the expansion of economic activity 
affects the spatial distribution of species, it is often assumed that the former is always "bad" for 
biodiversity conservation. In this paper, we not only show that this assumption is not always 
valid but also identify the conditions under which analogous centripetal-centrifugal forces in 
both the ecological and economic systems can influence the correct policy choice for optimal 
reserve location. We look forward to further advances in applying the new-economic-geography 
framework to the problem of designing better policies for reconciling biodiversity conservation 
and regional economic development. 
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Appendix 
A.1 Effects of Changes in N on CS-CS* in the Fixed-Factors Model  
 
Taking first and second derivatives of the second term on the right-hand side in equation (16) 
yields 
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Thus, (CS-CS*) is concave if N>1/2  and convex if N<1/2.  
 
A.2 Effects of Changes in N on CS-CS* in the Mobile-Workers Model  
The consumer-surplus differential is the complex term on the right-hand side of equation (26) 
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This is unambiguously positive. 
 
A.3 Effects of Changes in N on Marginal Welfare in the Mobile-Workers Model  
Differentiation of (29) with respect to N yields 
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The long term in brackets on the right-hand side is unambiguously positive. 
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